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The fall colloquium of the Center for Constitutional Law at Akron
highlighted the significant constitutional work of pioneering feminist
Elizabeth Cady Stanton for equality in the political, domestic, and
religious spheres. It also celebrated the conclusion of my ten-year
intellectual odyssey of Stanton’s instrumental work for the development
of feminism and family law. This colloquium brought together what in
my view is some of the best current thinking on Stanton’s intellectual
legacy. The New York Times Book Review often asks writers which
famous authors they would most like to invite to dinner, thus reflecting
the writer’s admiration for those authors’ work. Well these are my ideal
guests. Writing outside of the box, immersed in careful research, and
advancing the discourse on women’s history, these women epitomize the
excellence and depth of work emanating from the feminist scholarship
tradition.
My role at the colloquium was to introduce Elizabeth Cady Stanton.
For Stanton is not as well-known as she should be. She does now appear
briefly in history text books, identified as the founder of the women’s
suffrage movement at Seneca Falls, New York, in July 1848. The
Women’s Rights National Historical Park at Seneca Falls
commemorates this event. 1 Stanton’s political partnership with Susan B.
Anthony is somewhat familiar. 2 Stanton, though, was so much more.
She was the leading feminist thinker and figurehead of the “woman’s
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rights” movement of the nineteenth century. 3 Beginning with her
written Declaration of Sentiments at Seneca Falls, she demanded
wholescale reversal of women’s subordinate position in society and the
concomitant restraints on their autonomy. 4 She demanded the vote for
women, equality in employment and education, equality in the family
and parenting, reform of religious institutions, and the full eradication of
“separate spheres” and the notion of women’s moral, physical, and
intellectual inferiority. 5
Married to abolitionist reformer Henry Stanton, who ignored her
important work in pursuit of his own ambition, and burdened with the
care of seven children, Stanton moved in and out of political circles until
her children were grown. 6 When able to be in action, she petitioned the
New York Legislature for legal reform, including no-fault divorce,
domestic violence protection, women’s ownership of marital property,
and maternal custody of children. 7 She led the National Woman’s
Suffrage Association with Anthony, advocating a federal strategy for
voting rights and a constitutional amendment. And she challenged the
church with its foundational premises of women’s moral weakness and
sinful nature, rewriting key Biblical passages from a feminist perspective
and challenging the clergy’s omnipotent sexism. 8
The essays in this colloquium explore each of these key sites
Stanton identified as locations of women’s oppression: church, state, and
home. Felice Batlan begins in Domestic Disorders: Suffrage and New
York’s Constitutional Convention of 1867 by detailing Stanton’s work
for women’s suffrage at the state convention, revealing the charged
political context in which questions of African American suffrage and
fears of women’s loss of domesticity foreclosed her demands. Lisa
Tetrault elaborates on Stanton’s demand for women’s political equality,
revealing new insights about her views of political economy and the
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ways in which class inequality converged with women’s rights. Lisa
Hogan in Sexual Exploitation in the Rhetoric of Elizabeth Cady Stanton
then picks up the trail about the fear of women’s loss of domesticity in
the home, discussing Stanton’s critique of the sexualization of women in
marriage and society. Completing the overview of Stanton’s intellectual
work, Kathi Kern taps into Stanton’s ideas about religious liberty, and
juxtaposes those against similar arguments of liberty made today in
opposition to women’s rights.
My own contribution to an intellectual history of Stanton’s work
focuses on her ideas and advocacy for equality in the family. In my
forthcoming book, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist
Foundations of Family Law, I delve into her work in six areas of
domestic relations: marital property, marriage, domestic violence,
divorce, reproductive choice, and parenting. 9 What I discovered was
that Stanton advocated virtually every gender equality law reform that
was later advanced and adopted after the 1970s divorce revolution. No
fault divorce, joint marital property, marital partnerships, bodily
autonomy, domestic violence protections, and maternal custody were all
proposed by Stanton. These seem so non-controversial today because
they have all become the status quo of the law. But in the nineteenth
century, these ideas granting women social and sexual equality in the
private sphere of the family clashed with Victorian ideals and the
privilege of manhood embedded in legal doctrines of coverture. She had
few supporters of these family equality ideas, despite large affiliations
on the topic of women’s suffrage. The family was considered off-limits,
private, and the bastion of protected femininity. Contradicting this
conventional wisdom, Stanton exposed the private domestic sphere as
repressive, not protective, denying women legal rights, autonomy, and
ultimately, freedom.
The context of the family was also where Stanton developed her
insight as to the commonalities of women as a class. 10 Using domestic
relations as the prime example, Stanton illustrated how all women were
treated the same by the law—denied economic, legal, and personal rights
regardless of their individual circumstances, class, wealth, or abilities.
Here, she proved, all women were treated the same because of their sex.
It was this universality that Stanton used to draw women together in a
social and legal movement, moving beyond their reluctance and
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dismissals of “I have all the rights I want.” This notion of class-based
commonality would become critical to constitutional challenge to sex
discrimination, as developed by the Supreme Court in twentieth-century
jurisprudence. 11
The work of writing feminist history continues as scholars in law,
history, women’s studies, and all fields continue to recover the missing
pieces of history. Until that recovery is fully integrated into the
conventional narratives of a shared history, we have much left to do.
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